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ABSTRACT
This paper asks how a fiscal expansion would affect Japan. It uses a textbook-style macro model
calibrated to fit the Japanese economy. According to the results, Japan’s output slump would be
ended by a fiscal transfer of 6.6% of GDP. This policy raises the debt-income ratio in the short run,
but it reduces this ratio in the long run through higher inflation and tax revenue.  The financing of
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I. INTRODUCTION 
     When an economy slumps, policymakers typically stimulate 
demand by reducing short-term interest rates.  Japan’s experience 
in the last decade has renewed interest in an old question: what 
to do when rates can’t be lowered.  Weak demand has produced an 
output slump and deflation.  But short-term rates cannot fall 
because they are already at their lower bound of zero.  Japan has 
experienced this “liquidity trap” since 1998.  Can policy still 
stimulate demand? 
     The textbook remedy for a liquidity trap is a fiscal 
expansion.  Japanese policy is complicated, however, by a large 
and rising government debt.  This problem led the major rating 
agencies to downgrade Japan’s debt in 2002.  Policymakers resist 
a fiscal expansion because they believe it would exacerbate the 
debt problem.     
     Others, however, argue for a fiscal expansion.  Kuttner and 
Posen (2001) suggest that this policy would not only boost output 
but also have benign effects on Japan’s debt problem.  They argue 
that Japan’s large budget deficits have mainly been caused by its 
output slump.  By ending the slump, a fiscal expansion would 
eventually raise tax revenues, and higher inflation would reduce 
the real value of debt.  These effects would offset the direct 
costs of a fiscal expansion.   
     Several advocates of a fiscal expansion suggest a twist:  
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money finance (e.g. Mankiw, 1999; Stevens, 2001).  They advocate 
a “helicopter drop” of money – or, equivalently, a bond-financed 
fiscal expansion coupled with purchases of the new debt by the 
central bank.  Monetization of the debt would eliminate the 
direct fiscal costs of the policy, leaving only the benefits from 
economic stimulus.  Bernanke (2003) summarizes the argument for a 
money-financed tax cut:  
Isn’t it irresponsible to recommend a tax cut, given the 
poor state of Japanese public finances?  To the contrary, 
from a fiscal perspective, the policy would almost certainly 
be stabilizing, in the sense of reducing the debt-to-GDP 
ratio.  The BOJ’s purchases would leave the nominal quantity 
of debt in the hands of the public unchanged, while nominal 
GDP would rise owing to increased nominal spending.  Indeed, 
nothing would help reduce Japan’s fiscal woes more than 
healthy growth in nominal GDP and hence in tax revenues. 
 
     This paper examines these ideas.  It uses a textbook-style 
macro model calibrated to fit the Japanese economy.  The model’s 
initial conditions are based on the situation in 2003.  I 
determine the fiscal transfer needed to boost output to 
potential, and derive the effects over time on output, inflation, 
and the debt-income ratio.  I compare results for a bond-financed 
transfer, a money-financed transfer, and a baseline case with 
passive fiscal policy.  In most exercises, I assume monetary 
policy follows a Taylor rule once interest rates become positive. 
     The results are generally favorable to fiscal expansions.  
For base parameter values, a transfer of 6.6% of GDP returns 
output to potential in the following year, and thereafter only  
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small transfers are needed to keep it there.  The output recovery 
ends deflation, and the interest rate becomes positive; then the 
Taylor rule guides the economy to a steady state with low 
positive inflation.  If the fiscal transfer is financed with 
bonds, the debt-income ratio jumps up when the transfer occurs, 
but then it falls as output and inflation rise.  Two years after 
the transfer, the debt-income ratio falls below its level under 
passive policy, and it remains lower in steady state.  Thus the 
transfer improves the long-run fiscal situation as well as ending 
the output slump.     
     Does it matter if the fiscal expansion is financed with 
money rather than debt?  Money finance prevents the debt-income 
ratio from jumping up when the transfer occurs.  For base 
parameter values, this ratio remains lower with money finance 
than with debt finance for nine years.  In year ten, however, the 
debt paths under the two policies converge.  The initial 
financing of the transfer is irrelevant in the long run. 
     These results arise because the Taylor rule becomes 
operative in year 10.  In that year the central bank sets a 
positive interest rate, which requires a contraction of the 
monetary base.  It reduces the base by selling government bonds. 
  
The necessary contraction is larger if the initial transfer was 
money-financed, and the extra sales of debt offset the initial  
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savings from monetization. 
      The rest of this paper contains seven sections.  Section II 
presents additional background and Section III presents the 
model.  Sections IV-VI derive the implications of passive fiscal 
policy, debt-financed transfers, and money financed transfers.  
Section VII considers robustness and Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
     This section reviews Japan’s recent history and the debate 
over fiscal policy. 
A. Japan’s Slump 
     Figure 1 presents annual data on Japan’s economy from 1990 
to 2003.  I use the experience of this period to guide my 
modeling of the economy.  The situation in 2003 is summarized in 
Table I.  In simulating alternative policies, I use data from 
2003 as initial conditions. 
     The top panel of the Figure shows the log of real output.  
Output growth averaged 1.3% per year over 1990-2003, compared to 
4.0% from 1980 to 1990.  Early in the slump, some blamed it on 
slow growth of potential output due to “structural” factors.  
Today, however, most economists agree that output has fallen 
below potential because of deficient demand.  Apparent demand 
shocks include a collapse in asset prices, a credit crunch, and 
policy mistakes (e.g. Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004; Posen, 2004).  
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     There is, of course, uncertainty about the gap between 
output and potential output.  Following McCallum (2000) and 
Hoshi-Kashyap, Figure 1 presents a path for potential based on 
the assumption that it has grown 2% per year since 1990.  This 
approach produces an output gap of -9% in 2003.  Using production 
functions, some researchers have estimated recent gaps of around 
-5% (e.g. Ahearne et al, 2002; Leigh, 2004).  In my simulations, 
I assume an initial output gap of -7.5%. 
     Figure 1 also shows inflation, as measured by the GDP 
deflator and by core CPI.  The slump of the 90s dragged inflation 
down, as predicted by the accelerationist Phillips curve.  In 
2000, inflation reached about -1% (a bit higher for the CPI and a 
bit lower for the deflator).  Since then, inflation has remained 
fairly constant.  I use -1% as the initial value of inflation. 
     The stability of inflation since 2000 is not consistent with 
a conventional Phillips curve.  Such an equation predicts 
accelerating deflation when the output gap is negative.  The 
cause of this anomaly is unclear, but Blanchard (2000) suggests 
one possibility.  The accelerationist Phillips curve is based on 
the assumption that expected inflation equals past inflation.  
This relation breaks down if people view deflation as transitory 
 – if they expect a return to non-negative inflation.  In this 
case, an output slump causes deflation but not accelerating  
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deflation.  I will incorporate this idea in the paper’s model.
1   
     The last two panels of Figure 1 show the behavior of 
monetary policy.  The BOJ responded to the slump and falling 
inflation by cutting the short-term interest rate.  Leigh (2004) 
shows that a conventional Taylor rule captures this behavior up 
to 1998.  At that point, the Taylor-rule interest rate became 
negative, and the actual rate hit the zero bound.  The interest 
rate has stayed close to zero since then.   
     The monetary base grew steadily as the interest rate fell.   
Base growth accelerated under the policy of “quantitative 
easing,” which entailed large open-market operations.  The base 
grew 26% in 2002 and 16% in 2003, reaching 20% of GDP.  With the 
interest rate stuck at zero, this monetary expansion did not have 
obvious effects on output or inflation.  This experience is 
consistent with a textbook liquidity trap. 
B. A Fiscal Solution? 
                                                 
1 Econometric research suggests that the Japanese Phillips curve broke down sometime in 
the 1990s.  See Fukao (2004). 
     The classic solution to a liquidity trap is a fiscal 
expansion.  However, Japanese policymakers are reluctant to try 
this policy, for two reasons.  First, many argue that fiscal 
policy is ineffective in raising output.  Second, they fear that 
a fiscal expansion would exacerbate the problem of a growing  
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national debt. 
     This paper rejects the first reason.  It is based on the 
view that Japan tried fiscal expansions in the 1990s without 
success (e.g. Friedman, 2001).  This view has been debunked by 
Posen (1998) and Kuttner and Posen (2001).  They show that 
several “expansion” programs failed because they were not really 
expansions – they consisted mainly of normal expenditures.  There 
were large fiscal deficits, but these mainly reflected revenue 
losses caused by the slump.  In periods of true fiscal loosening, 
such as 1995, output responded. 
     Kuttner and Posen also estimate multipliers for fiscal 
policy in Japan.  They use the structural VAR approach of 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which controls for the cyclical 
behavior of deficits.  Kuttner and Posen find that a 100 yen tax 
cut raises output one year later by about 125 yen. 
     This paper will worry more about the second objection to 
fiscal expansion: its effects on Japan’s public debt.  Figure 2 
shows the path of net government debt as a percent of GDP.  This 
ratio rose from 0.13 in 1991 to 0.79 in 2003, and forecasters 
predict that it will continue to rise.  Long-term budget 
projections are bleak because of Japan’s aging population.  Many 
analysts fear an eventual fiscal crisis, possibly even default.  
As a result, Japan’s debt has been downgraded to A2/AA-, the  
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level for many developing countries.
2 
     This paper will look for policies that end Japan’s slump 
without worsening its debt problem.  I will ask whether a fiscal 
transfer can do so –- whether the fiscal benefits from higher 
output and inflation outweigh the direct costs of the transfer.  
I will also consider the effects of financing the transfer with 
money rather than bonds. 
 
III. THE MODEL 
                                                 
2 According to the OECD, Japan’s gross government debt for 2003 was 157% of GDP 
and government assets were 78%, yielding net debt of 79%.  Broda and Weinstein (2004) 
suggest two adjustments to this figure.  Like this paper, they view the government and the central 
bank as the same entity, and thus subtract government bonds owned by the central bank.  This 
reduces  net debt by 16% of GDP.  Second, they add bad loans from the government to the 
private sector, which by coincidence are also 16% of GDP.  The two adjustments cancel, so net 
debt is still 79%.   
     Japan’s problems are largely explained by textbook macro 
models.  A fall in aggregate demand has reduced output, and 
monetary policy is ineffective because the interest rate has hit 
zero.  Kuttner and Posen say “the basic lesson of Japan’s Great 
Recession for policymakers is to trust what you learned in 
intermediate macroeconomics class.”  In that spirit, I study a 
model with textbook equations such as an IS curve and a money  
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demand function.  I add simple dynamics following Svensson (1997) 
and Ball (1999).  The only unorthodox equation is the Phillips 
curve, which is modified to capture Japan’s steady deflation.    
A. Assumptions 
     Output: Potential output Y* grows by g percent per year.  
Actual output Y deviates from potential according to an IS 
equation:        
   (1)     (Yt-Y*t)/Y*t  =  λ(Yt-1-Y*t-1)/Y*t-1 - β(rt-1-r*t-1) 
                                               + δ(Gt-1/Y*t-1), 
where t indexes years, G is real transfers from the government, r 
is the real interest rate, r* is the “neutral” interest rate, and 
all parameters are positive.  The real rate r is i-π, where i is 
the nominal rate and π is inflation.  In words, the output gap 
depends on the lagged gap, the lagged real interest rate, and 
lagged transfers.  The one-year lags are consistent with Japanese 
evidence (see Kuttner and Posen). 
     Inflation: Inflation is determined by an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve: 
   (2)     πt  =  πt
e + α(Yt-1-Y*t-1)/Y*t-1 , 
where π
e is expected inflation.  A conventional assumption is 
that expected inflation equals lagged inflation, πt
e = πt-1.  I 
assume instead that 
   (3)     πt
e  =  max{πt-1, 0}.  
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The conventional assumption holds when lagged inflation is non-
negative, but expectations do not follow actual inflation below 
zero.  When πt-1≥0, (2) and (3) imply that output determines the 
change in inflation.  When πt-1<0, output determines the level of 
inflation, as suggested by Blanchard. 
     Section VII replaces equation (3) with the assumption that  
πt
e always equals πt-1.  This change does not greatly affect the 
economy’s response to fiscal expansions.  It does change the 
baseline case with passive fiscal policy.  If πt
e=πt-1 and policy 
is passive, the economy falls into a spiral of accelerating 
deflation. 
    Money: The central bank controls the stock of base money, M, 
through open-market operations.  Money evolves according to 
   (4)     Mt  =  Mt-1 + Zt ,  
where Z is central-bank purchases of government bonds (Z<0 means 
sales of bonds).  The demand for base money is given by 
   (5)     ln(Mt/PtYt) =  k - γit ,   it > 0 ;  
                      ≥  k ,        it = 0 , 
where P is the price level.  This equation imposes a unit income 
elasticity of money demand (which is consistent with Japanese 
data).  At positive interest rates, there is a constant interest-
rate semi-elasticity; at a zero interest rate, money demand 
becomes flat.  Figure 3 shows the money demand function in a  
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graph.
3 
     Debt: I measure Japan’s fiscal problem with privately-held 
debt, which excludes debt held by the central bank.  Thus I 
ignore the separate balance sheets of the government and central 
bank and treat them as one entity.  Nominal debt Dt, evolves 
according to 
   (6)     Dt  =  Dt-1 + it-1Dt-1 + PtGt - Zt - θ(PtYt - PtY*t) . 
Debt is past debt plus changes from four sources: interest 
payments on the past debt; current nominal transfers; open-market 
purchases, which reduce debt; and a term for the government’s 
primary surplus in the absence of transfers.  This surplus is 
assumed to be zero when output equals potential (Yt=Yt*).  It  
varies procyclically when output fluctuates.
4 
     In reality, Japan’s primary surplus would probably be 
                                                 
3 It is common to specify a demand function like (5) for M1 rather than the monetary 
base.  This would not affect the analysis if one assumes a constant ratio of M1 to the base, i.e. a 
constant money multiplier.  This multiplier is fairly stable in Japan. 
4 Equation (6) implicitly assumes that government debt has a maturity of one year.  In 
reality, much of Japan’s debt is long-term.  Adding long-term debt to the model would 
strengthen the case for fiscal expansion.  As shown below, an expansion raises the path of 
interest rates.   Higher rates imply capital losses for holders of long-term debt, which are capital 
gains for the government.  
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negative even if output were at potential.  Ignoring this fact 
helps us isolate the effects of exogenous fiscal expansions.  
Section VII extends the model to include a primary deficit when 
Y=Y*. 
B. Calibration 
     Table 2 presents base values for the model’s parameters. 
Section VII considers robustness to changes in these parameters.  
     In the IS equation, I set β, the coefficient on the real 
interest rate, to 1.0.  This follows Ball’s (1999) calibration 
for the U.S. (I have not found Japanese evidence).  For the other 
IS parameters, I use Kuttner and Posen’s econometric results.  
They estimate that δ, the effect of lagged transfers on output, 
is 1.25 and λ, the effect of lagged output, is 0.6.  The effect 
of transfers is smaller than Blanchard and Perotti’s estimates 
for the U.S.
5 
     I also use Kuttner and Posen’s estimate of θ, the effect of 
output on the primary surplus.  They find θ=0.25.  This appears 
conservative, as taxes are 20% of Japanese output and marginal 
taxes are higher than average taxes. 
     The Phillips curve slope, α, is 0.2.  This estimate comes 
                                                 
5 More precisely, Kuttner and Posen estimate an equation for log output, and get a 
coefficient of -0.25 on log taxes.  Dividing by the ratio of taxes to GDP (approximately 0.2) 
yields the yen-for-yen effect of taxes and transfers on output. 
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from studies at the BOJ (e.g. Hirose and Kamada, 2002).  The 
Phillips curve appears flatter in Japan than in the U.S., where α 
is often estimated around 0.4. 
     In the money demand equation, the interest rate semi-
elasticity, γ, is 0.1, based on estimates by Fujiki et al. (2002) 
and Miyao (2002).  The parameter k is the point at which the 
money demand curve hits an interest rate of zero.  I calibrate it 
using the historical evidence in Figure 1.  When the interest 
rate reached zero in 1998, the ratio of the monetary base to GDP 
was about 0.1.  This implies k=ln(0.1).  
     The growth rate of potential output, g, is 2% per year. 
C. The Neutral Interest Rate      
     It remains to calibrate the neutral real interest rate, r*. 
 This is a thorny issue.  There is debate about whether this 
parameter is positive or negative in Japan (e.g. Krugman, 2000). 
 My view is that r* is currently negative, but unlikely to stay 
negative forever.  My calibration will capture this idea.   
     The neutral interest rate is the one that produces Y=Y* in 
the absence of a fiscal expansion.  It seems clear that r* has 
been negative in the early 2000's.  The actual real rate has been 
about 1% and Y has been far below Y*.  Thus r* must be well below 
1%.  I assume an initial r* of -2%, which implies r-r* = 3%.  For 
this value of r-r*, the output gap converges to -7.5% if there is 
no fiscal transfer.  Thus the calibration captures the idea that  
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output is stuck at a low level. 
     It is unlikely, however, that r* will stay negative forever. 
 Iwamura et al. (2004) and Leigh (2004) estimate that r*  
was well above zero before the 1990s, but fell during the 90s 
slump.  The fall in r* means the IS curve shifted in.  This shift 
reflected adverse demand shocks, such as the credit crunch and 
fall in confidence.  It is likely that these problems will 
someday abate.  Eventually, a cleanup of banking may spur greater 
lending.  Or a recovery due to external demand will raise 
confidence and improve balance sheets.  Whatever the reason, the 
IS curve will shift back out and r* will return to a positive 
level.   
     I assume that r* eventually rises to +2%.  Of course it is 
hard to guess how quickly this will happen.  In the base 
specification, I assume that r* rises linearly from -2% to +2% 
over ten years.  The IS curve shifts outward, but slowly.  Since 
this assumption is arbitrary, variations on the r* path are a top 
priority among robustness checks. 
 
IV. A BASELINE CASE 
     This section derives the path of the economy if there is no 
fiscal expansion: Gt=0 for all t.  The economy starts in year 0 
with the initial conditions in Table 2.  This exercise provides a 
baseline for measuring the effects of fiscal policy.  
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A. Monetary Policy 
     To close the model, I must specify the behavior of monetary 
policy.  I assume an interest-rate rule based on the past 
behavior of the Bank of Japan.  Recall that the BOJ appeared to 
follow a Taylor rule until the interest rate hit zero.  This 
behavior is captured by  
   (7)     it  =  max{i
T
t, 0} , 
              i
T
t = r*t + πt + a(Yt-Y*t)/Y*t + b(πt-π*) ,  
where π* is an inflation target.  The variable i
T is the interest 
rate dictated by a Taylor rule: it depends on the output gap and 
inflation.  The BOJ sets an interest rate of i
T if i
T is 
positive, and zero if i
T is negative.  BOJ officials have 
suggested the same rule in describing their policy (Baba et al., 
2004).  
     When the rule delivers a positive interest rate, the money 
demand equation determines M.  M and lagged M determine open 
market purchases, Z.  When i=0, M is not determined by the rule, 
because money demand is flat.  In this case, I make the 
additional assumption that Z=0, so M equals lagged M.  That is, I 
assume the BOJ does not pursue open-market operations if they do 
not affect the interest rate.  (Section VI examines an 
alternative assumption.) 
     In the Taylor rule, the coefficients a and b are chosen as 
follows.  Taylor rules with certain parameters are equivalent to  
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“flexible” inflation targeting: a policy that returns inflation 
to π* at a fixed rate (see Svensson [1997] and Ball [1999] for 
proofs in similar models).  I assume that inflation moves halfway 
to its target each period.  One can show that this implies a=1.1 
and b=2.5. 
     I assume the inflation target π* is 2%, which is close to 
the targets of many countries.    
     Given initial conditions and the policy rule, it is 
straightforward to derive the evolution of the economy.  Each 
period, Y and π are determined by past conditions through (1)-
(3).  Inflation π determines the price level P.  The policy rule 
determines i, M, and Z, as described above.  Finally, equation 
(6) determines D. 
B. Results 
     Figure 4 shows the paths of some key variables: the output 
gap, π, i, and the ratios of Z, M, and D to GDP.  Starting from 
period 0, output stays in a deep slump for several years and then 
slowly recovers as r* increases.  The output gap rises above -5% 
in year 6, and it becomes positive in year 10.  From years 1 to 
9, there is a cumulative output gap of -54%. 
     Inflation falls to -1.5% and then inches up as the economy 
recovers.  It becomes positive in year 11.  Through that year the 
Taylor rule prescribes a negative interest rate, so i is stuck at 
zero.       
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     In year 12, the recovery pushes the Taylor-rule interest 
rate above zero.  The rule begins to operate, and it guides 
inflation smoothly to the target of 2%.  Output temporarily 
overshoots potential as inflation rises. 
     While the interest rate is zero, the money stock is constant 
and nominal GDP grows (the growth in Y exceeds the fall in P).  
The money/GDP ratio declines slowly.  In year 12, when the 
interest rate becomes positive, the money/GDP ratio  
falls by more than half.  This occurs through a large monetary 
contraction: open-market purchases, Z, are -8% of GDP.  This 
action is needed because of the high level of money at the start 
of the simulation.  Although the money/GDP ratio falls in years 
1-11, it remains far above the level that produces a positive 
interest rate.  Thus a large money absorption is needed when the 
Taylor rule takes effect. 
     The debt-income ratio rises initially, because the output 
slump produces primary deficits.  The ratio peaks at 0.85 in year 
5, then falls as the economy recovers.  It jumps up in year 12, 
when the large monetary contraction occurs.  The BOJ’s sales of 
government bonds raise the level of privately-held debt. 
     In steady state, the debt-income ratio falls slowly.  The 
primary deficit is zero, and interest payments are balanced by 
income growth, since r=g=2%.  The fall in the debt ratio results 
from seignorage revenue, as Z>0 in steady state.  The ratio  
  18 
reaches 0.77 in year 25. 
 
V. A BOND-FINANCED FISCAL EXPANSION 
     This section examines how a bond-financed fiscal expansion  
changes the evolution of the economy. 
A. The Policy 
     In this experiment, interest-rate policy is the same as 
before: i=max{i
T,0}.  And once again, Z=0 when i=0. 
     However, this policy is now accompanied by fiscal transfers. 
 These transfers add to government debt through equation (6).  
The transfers begin in year 1; given the lag in the IS curve, 
they start affecting output in year 2.  The transfers are chosen 
to end the slump quickly and permanently: the output gap is non-
negative in years 2, 3,....  Each period, the government makes 
the smallest transfer sufficient to achieve this result.   
     To state this policy formally, let Gt* be the real transfer 
 that produces Yt+1=Yt+1*.  Gt* can be computed from the IS curve 
given the state at t.  The rule for transfers is 
   (8)     Gt  =  max{Gt*, 0} , t≥1 . 
If a positive transfer is needed to keep output at potential, it 
is made.  If a negative transfer would keep output at potential, 
no transfer is made.  In this case, output exceeds potential. 
B. The Path of Transfers 
     Figure 5 shows the series of fiscal transfers implied by  
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equation (8).  In year 1, the transfer is 6.6% of output (Y), or 
6.1% of potential output (Y*).  Given the multiplier of 1.25, 
this transfer is needed to produce a zero output gap in period 2, 
rather than the -7.6% gap of the baseline case.  The transfer is 
2.2% of output in year 2, less than 1% in years 3 and 4, and zero 
thereafter.  The necessary transfer peters out because r-r* 
falls, stimulating spending.  (The real rate falls because π 
rises, and r* rises by assumption.)  The cumulative transfer over 
years 1-4 is 9.4% of output. 
     This fiscal expansion is large by historical standards, but 
not gigantic.  Over the 1990s, Japan experienced a series of 
changes in taxes and government spending (Kuttner and Posen, 
2001).  Several of these shifts amounted to 2% of GDP or more; a 
1998 stimulus package was 4%.  The total effect of fiscal policy 
was small, because expansions in some years were offset by 
contractions in others (such as the 1997 tax increase).  The key 
difference between the transfers proposed here and recent 
practice is that policy pushes consistently in one direction. 
C. Effects of the Transfers 
     Figure 6 shows the effects of fiscal transfers.  It compares 
the economy’s path under the transfer rule (8) (the dashed line) 
to the baseline case without transfers (the solid line).  By 
construction, the transfers return output to potential in period 
2; most of the long slump in the baseline case is eliminated.   
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The faster recovery implies that inflation and the interest rate 
start rising sooner than before.  Nonetheless, the Taylor rule 
guides the economy to the same steady state, with 2% inflation.   
     The large transfer in period 1 causes the debt-income ratio 
to jump up: it reaches 0.87, compared to 0.81 in the baseline 
case.  After that the ratio falls rapidly as the transfers fuel 
growth and inflation.  In year 2, the debt-income ratio with 
transfers (0.825) is very close to the ratio in the baseline case 
(0.824); in year 3, the ratio with transfers falls below the 
baseline case.  It remains lower in all future years, except for 
year 11 when it is slightly higher.  (The result for year 11 
reflects the fact that the nominal interest rate rises earlier 
with transfers.  The jump in debt from the necessary monetary 
contraction occurs sooner.) 
     In steady state the debt-income ratio falls slowly in both 
the baseline case and the case with transfers.  However, the path 
of the ratio is lower with transfers.  In year 25, the ratio is 
0.72 with transfers and 0.77 without them.  Thus the transfers 
produce a win-win: they end the output slump quickly and they 
improve the long-run fiscal situation. 
     To better understand these results, note that the cumulative 
output gap in the baseline case is -44% of potential output.  The 
cumulative gap with transfers is -5%, so the transfers raise 
output by a total of 39% of potential.  The effect of output on  
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government revenue, θ, is 0.25; thus revenue rises by (0.25)39% = 
9.8% of potential output.  This gain more than offsets the 
initial transfers, which total 9.4% of potential.  The transfers 
also reduce the debt-income ratio by raising inflation.  
Inflation reaches zero in period 3, while it stays negative 
through period 10 in the baseline case.  The faster rise in 
inflation reduces real interest rates on the debt.  
 
VI. A MONEY-FINANCED FISCAL EXPANSION 
     This section considers fiscal transfers financed by printing 
money rather than issuing debt.  I ask whether money finance 
produces lower debt-income ratios, as suggested by Bernanke and 
others. 
A. The Policy 
     In this experiment, the fiscal transfers are the same as 
before (see the path in Figure 5).  There are positive transfers 
in years 1 through 4.  The government finances the transfers by 
issuing bonds and the central bank buys the bonds.  The central 
bank’s purchases equal the nominal level of transfers:  
   (9)     Zt  =  PtGt ,    t=1,...,4 .   
These actions raise the money stock by the amount of the 
transfers, and leave privately-held debt unchanged.  Thus they 
are equivalent to a helicopter drop of money. 
     After year 4, monetary policy behaves as in the previous  
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experiments.  Open-market purchases are zero until the Taylor 
rule prescribes a positive interest rate, and then this rule 
determines policy. 
B. Results 
     The fiscal multiplier does not depend on how transfers are 
financed.  Thus switching from debt to money finance does not 
change the path of output.  There is also no effect on inflation 
or the interest rate, since the Phillips curve and Taylor rule 
are unchanged.  The only changes are in open-market operations, 
the money stock, and debt.  Figure 7 shows the paths of these 
variables.  It compares the case of money-financed transfers (the 
dotted lines) to the cases of bond-financed transfers and no 
transfers. 
     When the transfers are money-financed, the money/income 
ratio jumps up in year 1.  In contrast to the case of bond 
finance, the debt-income ratio does not rise sharply.  In years 1 
through 9, the money-income ratio is higher with money finance, 
and the debt-income ratio is lower by the same amount.  
Policymakers have substituted money for debt.  
     Things change in year 10, when the Taylor rule becomes 
operative.  As before, contractionary open-market operations are 
needed to reduce money to the level consistent with the Taylor 
rule.  The necessary open-market sales are larger in the case of 
money-financed transfers, because the money-income ratio is  
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higher in year 9.  The extra sales of debt raise the debt-income 
ratio to its path in the bond-finance case.  In other words, the 
monetization of debt in years 1-4 is reversed in year 10: money 
is turned back into debt.  Starting in year 10, the initial 
financing of transfers is irrelevant to all variables in the 
model. 
     In light of these results, does it matter how transfers are 
initially financed?  Monetization has no effect on output or 
inflation, and no long-run effect on debt.  However, it prevents 
the jump in the debt-income ratio that occurs in year 1 if 
transfers are debt-financed.  With money finance, the debt-income 
ratio never significantly exceeds its level in the baseline case. 
Thus monetization matters if we care about the short-run path of 
debt, not just its steady-state behavior. 
     Do we care about the short-run path of debt?  To address 
this question, we must go beyond the model and ask why debt 
matters.  A high debt-income ratio is dangerous because investors 
may start to fear default, sparking a financial crisis (Ball and 
Mankiw, 1995).  Higher debt at a point in time might increase 
this danger, even holding constant the long-run behavior of debt. 
 Investors are more likely to panic when they hold more debt, 
because they have more to lose from an immediate default.  
However, the importance of this effect is unclear.  The case for 
money-financed transfers is not as compelling as some economists  
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suggest.
6 
C. A Permanent Monetary Expansion 
                                                 
6 Goodfriend (2001) and Suda (2001) argue that a monetary expansion to finance 
transfers would eventually have to be reversed, with adverse fiscal consequences.  Their 
arguments anticipate the results of this section. 
              Auerbach and Obtsfeld (2004) present a model in which expansionary open-market 
operations reduce debt permanently.  This result contradicts my finding that monetization of debt 
is irrelevant in the long run.  The differences between Auerbach-Obstfeld’s results and mine 
arise from different assumptions about inflation.  In the Auerbach-Obstfeld model, a monetary 
expansion causes inflation to rise, reducing real government debt, even when the interest rate is 
zero.  After that, inflation falls without a fall in output.  In my model, monetary policy cannot 




     In the previous experiment, the increase in money that 
finances transfers is reversed in the long run.  This fact 
follows from the conventional assumption that the central bank 
eventually follows a Taylor rule.  However, the reversal of the 
monetary expansion differs from some economists’ suggestions.  
Bernanke, for example, advocates money-financed transfers for 
which “much or all of the increase in the money stock is viewed  
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as permanent.”  Here I consider such a policy.  As one might 
guess, the policy prevents the debt-income ratio from jumping up 
at any point.  Unfortunately, it also produces hyperinflation.   
     Specifically, I assume again that transfers are governed by 
equation (8), and that they are financed by money creation. 
Monetary policy after the transfers is the same as in earlier 
experiments, except for a constraint: open-market purchases must 
be non-negative.  That is, after the money stock rises, it can 
never fall.  This constraint first binds in year 11, when the 
Taylor-rule interest rate becomes positive.  When the Taylor rule 
implies Zt<0, the central bank sets Zt=0 instead. 
     Figure 8 shows the effects of this policy.  Through year 9 
we see the same effects of money-financed transfers as before.  
In year 10, the Taylor rule starts calling for large open-market 
sales, but they do not occur.  Consequently, the money-income 
ratio stays high and the nominal interest rate stays at zero.  
The failure to tighten policy causes output and inflation to 
rise.  At this point, the economy enters an unstable spiral: 
higher inflation reduces the real rate, which raises output, 
which further raises inflation.  Without reducing money, the 
central bank cannot raise the interest rate to abort this 
process.  Inflation reaches 7% in year 15 and 90% in year 25, and 
keeps rising forever.
7   
                                                 
7 Eventually inflation reduces the money-income ratio sufficiently that the nominal  
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     BoJ officials have criticized the idea of money-financed 
transfers on the grounds that they would eventually produce high 
inflation.  Figure 8 shows a scenario in which this fear is 
realized.  We have seen that policymakers can prevent this 
outcome by reducing the money stock when inflation starts rising. 
 But this action reverses the fiscal gain that money finance is 
intended to achieve. 
 
VII. ROBUSTNESS  
     This section considers the robustness of my results.  I 
first vary the model’s parameters, and then consider broader 
changes in assumptions.   
     The paper’s main conclusions are fairly robust.  A fiscal 
expansion always produces a faster output recovery.  The long-run 
effects on the debt-income ratio vary across specifications.  In 
most cases, however, a fiscal expansion reduces debt below its 
level under passive policy.  In some cases, this gain is large.  
At worst, a fiscal expansion raises long-run debt by a small 
amount.            
A. The Neutral Real Rate 
                                                                                                                                                             
interest rate starts rising.  However, it rises more slowly than inflation, so the real rate falls 
forever. 
     As discussed in Section III, Japan’s neutral real interest  
  27 
rate appears to be negative, but is unlikely to stay negative 
forever.  So far, I have assumed the neutral rate r* starts at -
2% and rises linearly to +2% over ten years.  Here I continue to 
assume r* rises linearly from -2% to +2%, but vary the speed of 
this rise.  A fast increase in r* means the IS curve shifts out 
quickly. 
     A faster increase in r* weakens the case for fiscal 
expansion.  This is illustrated by Figure 9.  Like Figure 6, this 
Figure compares the economy’s evolution with passive policy and 
with the fiscal rule (8).  But it assumes that r* rises to +2% in 
five years rather than ten.  Fiscal expansion still raises 
output, but its effects on debt are a bit less favorable than 
before.  The debt-income ratio in year 25 is about one percentage 
point higher with the expansion than without. 
     This result reflects the effects of the r* path on output.  
If r* rises more quickly, then output recovers more quickly in 
the case of passive policy.  This reduces the benefits of ending 
the initial slump with a fiscal expansion.  There are smaller 
output gains, and hence smaller revenue gains to offset the  
initial cost of the expansion. 
     Figure 10 considers a range of paths for r*.  I assume this 
parameter rises linearly from -2% to +2% in n years, and vary n 
from 1 to 20.  For each n, the Figure shows the debt-income ratio 
in year 25 with passive policy and with a fiscal expansion.  The  
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expansion raises the debt-income ratio for n<6, but only by 
modest amounts.  The costs of expansion when n is small are lower 
than the gains when n is large. 
B. Equation Coefficients 
     Table 3 examines robustness to varying the coefficients in 
the model’s equations -- the IS and Phillips curves and the debt 
equation.  Starting from the base values in Table 2, I change one 
coefficient at a time, trying values that are twice as large and 
half as large.  For each variation, Table 3 reports the debt-
income ratio in year 25 with passive policy and with a fiscal 
expansion.
8 
                                                 
8 As I vary the model coefficients, I also vary the coefficients in the central bank’s 
interest-rate rule, equation (7).  As discussed in Section IV, the coefficients in (7) are chosen so 
that inflation moves halfway to its target each period.  The coefficients defined by this rule are 
functions of the IS and Phillips-curve coefficients. 
     Not surprisingly, a key coefficient is δ, the fiscal 
multiplier.  A larger multiplier means a smaller transfer is 
needed to return output to potential.  This reduces the debt-
income ratio in the case of expansionary policy.  Recall that the 
base value of δ is 1.25; for this value, the debt-income ratio in 
year 25 is 5 points lower with expansionary policy than with 
passive policy.  This gain rises to 9 points for δ=2.5, but it 
falls to -3 points for δ=0.625.  The gain is positive for all  
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δ>0.76.  
     When the other coefficients change, the fiscal gains from 
transfers are robust.  Transfers raise the long-run debt ratio in 
only one case (λ=0.3), and then by a trivial amount.  Often 
transfers reduce debt by large amounts (e.g. 41% of GDP for 
α=0.4). 
C. Perpetual Deficits 
     So far I have assumed the government’s primary budget is 
balanced if output is at potential and the transfers G are zero. 
 This assumption does not fit Japan today.  There is a large 
primary deficit, which is only partly cyclical.  It appears this 
deficit would be about 5% of GDP if output were at potential.   
     This fact can be captured by adding a term to the debt 
equation, (6).  The equation becomes 
    (9)  Dt  =  Dt-1 + it-1Dt-1 + PtGt - Zt - θ(PtYt - PtY*t)         
                                                + (0.05)PtY*t . 
The last term is the primary deficit when output is at potential. 
     This modification does not change the behavior of output or 
inflation, but it does affect the debt path.  For base parameter 
values, Figure 11 shows this path for the cases of passive and 
expansionary fiscal policy.  In both cases the debt-income ratio 
rises forever.  A permanent budget deficit leads to disaster. 
     However, fiscal expansion still compares favorably to 
passive policy.  Starting in year 2, the debt-income ratio is  
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always smaller with the expansion.  This policy does not 
eliminate the underlying deficit problem, but it slows the growth 
of debt. 
D. A Textbook Phillips Curve 
     The main model assumes that expected inflation cannot fall 
below zero.  Here I assume that expected inflation equals past 
inflation, even if past inflation is negative: 
    (10)     πt
e  =  πt-1 . 
This assumption and equation (2) produce an accelerationist 
Phillips curve: 
    (11)     πt  =  πt-1 + α(Yt-1-Y*t-1)/Y*t-1 . 
Figure 12 shows how this modification affects the economy under 
alternative policies. 
     The largest changes occur for the case of no fiscal 
expansion -- the solid line in the Figure.  In this case, the 
output slump leads to a deflationary spiral.  Low output reduces 
inflation, which raises the real interest rate, which further 
reduces output.  Inflation and output head to minus infinity.  
With an accelerationist Phillips curve, passive policy is 
disastrous. 
     The dashed line in the Figure shows the effects of the 
fiscal rule (8).  The outcomes from this policy are better than 
from passive policy, but still not good.  Inflation falls to -4% 
and then remains at that level.  The nominal interest rate stays  
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at zero, and the real rate rises to +4%.  The economy stays in a 
liquidity trap.  To keep output at potential, as required by rule 
(8), the government must provide transfers forever.  This causes 
the debt-income ratio to rise without bound.     
     In this version of the model, a more aggressive fiscal 
expansion is better.  The dotted line in Figure 12 shows what 
happens if the transfer in year 1 is 15% of potential output, 
rather than 7% as dictated by (8).  This transfer creates a boom 
in year 2, pushing inflation from -4% to -2% in year 3.  With 2% 
inflation, the real interest rate is low enough for the economy 
to escape the liquidity trap.  Eventually a non-negative output 
gap can be sustained without transfers.  The debt-income ratio 
peaks at 0.91 in year 26 and then falls. 
E. A Forward-Looking Real Interest Rate 
     The main model is backward-looking -- there is no role for 
expectations of future variables.  Here I introduce some forward-
looking behavior.  I define the real interest rate as the nominal 
rate minus expected future inflation, not current inflation.  
Since the model is non-stochastic, expected inflation equals 
actual future inflation.  The real interest rate is 
   (12)     rt  =  it - πt+1 .  
     This variation has only minor effects on the results.  Once 
again, a fiscal expansion ends the output slump and reduces long-
run debt.  The debt-income ratio in year 25 is 0.73 with fiscal  
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expansion and 0.79 with passive policy. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
     This paper examines the effects of fiscal transfers in a  
model of the Japanese economy.  Initial conditions are set to 
capture Japan’s slump as of 2003.  I determine the level of 
transfers needed to return output to potential, and the effects 
on inflation and the debt-income ratio.  I assume that monetary 
policy follows a Taylor rule once the interest rate becomes 
positive. 
     A quick output recovery requires transfers totaling 9.4% of 
potential GDP over four years.  After the recovery, the Taylor 
rule guides the economy to a steady state with output at 
potential and 2% inflation.  If the transfers are financed with 
bonds, they cause the debt-income ratio to jump up.  After that, 
the ratio falls rapidly due to higher growth, inflation, and tax 
revenue.  In steady state, the debt-income ratio is lower than in 
a baseline case with no transfers.  Thus the transfers produce a 
win-win: they end the output slump and reduce Japan’s long-run 
fiscal problem.      
     I also consider transfers financed with money rather than 
debt.  The finance method does not influence the paths of output 
or inflation.  It also does not affect the debt-income ratio in 
steady state, because the initial monetization of debt is  
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eventually reversed.  However, money finance prevents the initial 
run-up of debt that occurs with bond-financed transfers.  Thus 
money finance is preferable if policymakers care about short-run 
as well as long-run debt levels. 
     The results in this paper capture the ideas of some Japan-
watchers.  For example, in discussing the downgrade of Japan’s 
debt, Thomas Byrne of Moody’s argues that Japan needs a fiscal 
expansion: 
Japan can’t consolidate its way out of this (debt problem), 
it has to grow its way out.  Any policy that ends deflation 
and stimulates growth (is good).  A fiscal policy that 
didn’t include a lot of wasteful spending may present near-
term anxiety but, if it really did stimulate growth, it 
would be good over the long term. [quoted in Pilling (2002)] 
    
Byrne suggests that the long-run fiscal benefits from 
expansionary policy would outweigh the costs, as this paper 
finds.  The “near-term anxiety” he mentions is presumably caused 
by the temporary rise in debt from a bond-financed expansion.  
Thus Byrne also provides a rationale for money finance, which 
reduces debt in the short run.  
  34 
REFERENCES 
 
Ahearne, Alan, et al., “Preventing Deflation: Lessons from 
Japan’s Experience in the 1990s,” International Finance 
Discussion Paper, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2002.  
 
Auebach, Alan, and Maurice Obstfeld, “The Case for Open-Market 
Purchases in a Liquidity Trap,” University of California, 
Berkeley, 2004. 
 
Baba, Naohiko, et al., “Japan’s Deflation, Problems in the 
Financial System, and Monetary Policy,” Bank of Japan, 2004. 
 
Ball, Laurence, “Efficient Rules for Monetary Policy,   
 International  Finance 2 (April 1999), 63-83. 
 
Bernanke, Ben S., “Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan,” 
speech to Japan Society of Monetary Economics, May 31, 2003. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier, “Bubbles, Liquidity Traps, and Monetary 
Policy,” in Ryoichi Mikitani and Adam S. Posen (eds.), 
Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to U.S. 
Experience, Institute for International Economics, 2000. 
 
________ and Roberto Perotti, “An Empirical Characterization of 
the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and 
Taxes on Output,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 
(November 2002), 1329-1368. 
 
Broda, Christian, and David E. Weinstein, “Happy News from the 
Dismal Science: Reassessing Japanese Fiscal Policy and 
Sustainability,” Columbia University, 2004. 
 
Friedman, Milton, “No More Economic Stimulus Needed,” Wall Street 
 Journal October 10, 2001, A17. 
 
Fujiki, Hiroshi, Cheng Hsiao, and Yan Shen, “Is There a Stable 
Money Demand Function under the Low Interest Rate Policy? A 
Panel Data Analysis,” Bank of Japan Monetary and Economic 
Studies 20 (April 2002), 1-23. 
 
Fukao, Mitsuhiro, “Financial Strains and the Zero Lower Bound: 
The Japanese Experience,” Keio University, 2004. 
 
Goodfriend, Marvin, “Overcoming the Zero Bound on Interest Rate 
Policy,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 32 (November 
2000, Part 2), 1007-1035.   
  35 
 
Hirose, Yasuo and Koichiro Kamada, “Time-Varying NAIRU and 
Potential Growth in Japan,” Bank of Japan Research and 
Statistics Working Paper #02-8, 2002. 
 
Hoshi, Takeo, and Anil K Kashyap, “Japan’s Financial Crisis and 
Economic Stagnation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 
(Winter 2004), 3-26. 
 
Iwamura, Mitsuru, Takeshi Kudo, and Tsutomu Watanabe, “Monetary 
and Fiscal Policy in a Liquidity Trap: The Japanese 
Experience 1999-2004,” Institute of Economic Research, 
Hitotsubashi University, 2004. 
 
Kuttner, Kenneth N., and Adam S. Posen, “The Great Recession: 
Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy from Japan,” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 2001:2, 93-160. 
 
Krugman, Paul, “Thinking About the Liquidity Trap,” Journal of 
the Japanese and International Economies 14 (December 2000), 
221-37. 
 
Leigh, Daniel, “Monetary Policy and the Dangers of Deflation: 
Lessons from Japan,” Johns Hopkins University, 2004. 
 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, “Memo to Tokyo: Cut Taxes, Print Money,” 
 Fortune, January 11, 1999. 
 
McCallum, Bennett T., “Alternative Monetary Policy Rules: A 
Comparison with Historical Settings for the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Japan,” NBER Working Paper #7725, 
2000. 
 
Miyao, Ryuzo, “Liquidity Traps and the Stability of Money Demand: 
Is Japan Really Trapped at the Zero Bound?,” Kobe 
University, 2002. 
 
Pilling, David, “Japan Braced for a Rating Downgrade as Economy 
Dips,” Financial Times, March 9, 2002. 
 
Posen, Adam S., Restoring Japan’s Economic Growth, Institute for 
International Economics, 1998. 
 
________, “It Takes More Than a Bubble to Become Japan,” 
Institute for International Economics Working Paper #03-9, 
2003. 
 
Svensson, Lars E.O., “Inflation Forecast Targeting: Monitoring  
  36 
and Implementing Inflation Targets,” European Economic 
Review 41 (June 1997), 1111-1146. 
 
Stevens, Glenn, “Comment,” Bank of Japan Monetary and Economic 
 Studies 19 (September 2001), 313-321. 
 
Suda, Miyako, “The Effect of ‘Quantitative Monetary Easing’ When 
the Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate is Zero,” Bank of 
Japan, 2003.  
  37 
                         Table 1 
     Conditions in 2003 (Initial Conditions for Simulations) 
 
Output gap = -7.5% 
Inflation = -1.0% 
Nominal interest rate = 0 
Base/GDP = 0.20 
Debt/GDP = 0.79 
 
 
                          Table 2 
                  Base Parameter Values 
 
IS:  β=1.0,  λ=0.6,  δ=1.25 
Revenue:  θ=0.25 
Phillips curve:  α=0.2 
Money demand:  γ=0.1,  k=ln(0.1) 
Potential output:  g=0.02 
Neutral rate:  
   r*=-0.02 in year 0; grows linearly to +0.02 in year 10  Table 3: Varying the Parameter Values
with baseline policy with fiscal transfer
δ = 0.625 0.77 0.79
δ = 2.5 0.77 0.68
β = 0.5 0.67 0.66
β = 2 1.13 0.81
λ = 0.3 0.66 0.67
λ = 1.2 [very large] 0.86
α = 0.01 0.65 0.64
α = 0.04 1.20 0.79
θ = 0.125 0.73 0.72
θ = 0.5 0.85 0.71
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